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ABSTRACT
Neural networks can be repurposed via reprogramming to perform new tasks, which are different
from the tasks they were originally trained for. We introduce new and improved reprogramming
technique that, compared to prior works, achieves better accuracy, scalability, and can be success-
fully applied to more complex tasks. While prior literature focuses on potential malicious uses of
reprogramming, we argue that reprogramming can be viewed as an efficient training method. Our
reprogramming method allows for re-using existing pre-trained models and easily reprogramming
them to perform new tasks. This technique requires a lot less effort and hyperparameter tuning
compared training new models from scratch. Therefore, we believe that our improved and scal-




In this paper we introduce a new and improved reprogramming technique that allows for creating
new accurate neural net models. Compared to prior works on reprogramming, our methodology
is more sophisticated and can be applied to complex tasks. Also, while prior studies present
reprogramming as an adversarial attack, we view it as a new machine learning technique.
1.1 Introduction
Reprogramming of neural networks was introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019) as a new form
of adversarial attack that allows to ”...reprogram the target model to perform a task chosen by
the attacker - without the attacker needing to specify or compute desired output for each test-
time input” Elsayed et al. (2019). We successfully replicated their results; however, when we
applied their method to more complex tasks it did not perform well. In this paper we present new
and improved reprogramming methodology, which we successfully applied to complex classification
tasks. The reprogramming technique in Elsayed et al. (2019) relies on hardcoding an arbitrary
mapping between labels of the original and new tasks, and learning an adversarial program P.
The program P is applied as a universal additive contribution to all examples from the new task
domain regardless of their label to create X ′ = X + P . Our improved technique is instead based
on transforming input X to conform to the dimensions that the target model accepts: X ′ =
f(X), and learning a new prediction layer. In particular, our reprogramming method reuses model
hyperparameters of the target original model for layers 1 through L−1, where L is the total number
of layers. We then create a new Lth layer with number of neurons equal to number of new task
labels and learn its parameters, which can be formulated as θ̂ = argminθ(−logP (y|h)), where h are
the values of hidden units from the penultimate layer of the target model. Using our methodology,
we successfully reprogrammed several ImageNet models to perform classification on Caltech 101
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and reduced Caltech 256 datasets. Moreover, we demonstrate that creating a new model using
our reprogramming technique yields accurate results while requiring a lot less effort in terms of
training time and tuning compared to training a new model from scratch. Therefore, we argue
that reprogramming does not need to be adversarial, instead we view it as a new machine learning
technique.
1.2 Contributions
Our main contributions are two-fold:
• We demonstrate the shortcomings of the methodology for reprogramming introduced in prior
literature with various experiments to show that it does not scale to complex tasks. We hope
that this finding will be helpful to other researchers.
• We develop a new methodology for reprogramming that addresses the limitations of the
prior methodology. Our technique, compared to prior works, yields more accurate results, is
scalable, and can be applied to complex tasks. We also show that our reprogramming method
can be used to efficiently create new models. Creating new models using our reprogramming
methodology requires significantly less effort in terms of training time and hyperparameter
tuning compared to training models from scratch.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Adversarial reprogramming is a new research area of adversarial machine learning, which studies
security vulnerabilities of machine learning models. It is a new type of attack first introduced in
Elsayed et al. (2019), which involves reprogramming an existing machine learning model to perform
a different task. The adversarial reprogramming literature is very limited - to our best knowledge
there are only three works that studied adversarial reprogramming: Elsayed et al. (2019), Neekhara
et al. (2019), and Wang et al. (2019). Elsayed et al. (2019) successfully conducted white-box
adversarial reprogramming on neural net models for image classification. Neekhara et al. (2019)
demonstrated that reprogramming also works on text classification neural networks by performing
a white-box attack and also a black-box attack. And Wang et al. (2019) claim to have developed
a defense against reprogramming attacks.
2.1 Adversarial Machine Learning
Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks, have shown impressive performance
in several application domains. However, it has been shown that machine learning models are
susceptible to adversarial input examples that can easily fool them causing up to 100% error rate
Szegedy et al. (2014) and, thereby, render them useless. Machine learning is used for very important
applications such as search algorithms, automated trading, data analytics, driveless cars, malware
detection, etc. Therefore, an attack on those models could result in serious repercussions. For
example, an attack aimed at machine learning models used for automated electronic trading could
cause a market crash with real economic consequences. An attacker targeting computer vision
models processing traffic signs in driveless cars systems could cause a car crash by fooling a model
to misclassify a stop sign as a yield sign. These findings regarding security vulnerabilities of machine
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learning models gave rise to adversarial machine learning - a study of effective machine learning
techniques against an adversarial opponent.
Barreno et al. (2006) and Barreno et al. (2010) are one of the first works to discuss security in
machine learning. Biggio et al. (2012) explored poisoning attacks against support vector machines,
which involve injecting perturbed training data to ”poison” the model during training with the
goal of reducing testing accuracy. Biggio et al. (2013) then studied gradient-based evasion attacks,
white-box attacks conducted during the testing phase by manipulating the gradients of test inputs.
However, it was Szegedy et al. (2014), who showed that even state-of-the-art neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial examples, that sparked the growth of adversarial machine learning
research.
2.1.1 The Rise of Adversarial Machine Learning
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the environment during training and evaluation of
machine learning models is benign. Until the year 2014 the focus of machine learning research has
been on accuracy. However, after Szegedy et al. (2014) have shown that neural nets with human
level accuracy can have 100% error rate on adversarial examples, robustness of machine learning
models and protecting against adversarial attacks became an active research area. Goodfellow
et al. (2018) defines adversarial examples, a frequently used term in adversarial machine learning
literature, as inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause
the model to make a mistake.
2.1.1.1 Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Models
Attacks can be either untargeted or targeted depending on the goal of the attacker – an at-
tacker may design adversarial examples that cause the model to output any incorrect label, or a
specific incorrect label. Formally, given a target model that takes x as input and outputs y, and a
perturbation η, an adversarial example for an untargeted attack can be formulated as:
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x′ = x+ η, f(x) = y, x ∈ X s.t. f(x′) 6= y (2.1)
Adversarial example for a targeted attack can be expressed as:
x′ = x+ η, f(x) = y, x ∈ X s.t. f(x′) = y′ (2.2)
One important factor that determines the attack methods is the amount of knowledge that an
attacker has about the target model. In a white-box scenario the attacker has access to the model
architecture and parameters, whereas in a black-box scenario this information in not available and
the attacker can only query the target model for labels.
There are several white-box scenario techniques for crafting adversarial examples. Some of the
most common ones are: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGMS) Goodfellow et al. (2014), Limited
memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) algorithm Szegedy et al. (2014), Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) Papernot et al. (2015) , and Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack
developed by Carlini and Wagner (2016). The FGMS method is one of the most popular technique
for its low computational cost. It fixes the size of perturbation and maximizes loss as follows:
η = argmaxηJ(x+ η, y) s.t. ||η||∞ ≤ ε
η = argmaxηJ(x, y) + η
T∇xJ(x, y) s.t. ||η||∞ ≤ ε
η = ε× sgn(∇xJ(x, y))
(2.3)
where η is the perturbation, ε is the perturbation magnitude parameter, ∇xJ(x, y) is the loss
function gradient, and sgn is the sign function.
There are three types of methods that can be deployed to conduct a black-box attack: (1)
training a substitute model and leveraging white-box techniques for crafting adversarial examples,
(2) estimating gradients using zeroth order approximation, or (3) GenAttack, a gradient-free op-
timization technique that uses genetic algorithms for synthesising adversarial examples.
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2.1.1.2 Causes of Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are not created by adding random noise to legitimate inputs, instead
they are carefully computed perturbations that possess the property of transferability. Adversarial
examples crafted for a particular model transfer to other models, which means that the same
adversarial examples can be applied to different models to cause mistakes Szegedy et al. (2014). In
particular, adversarial examples generated against a neural network can fool other neural networks
with the same architecture, but trained on different datasets Szegedy et al. (2014). It has also been
shown that adversarial examples can also fool neural networks with different architectures and
even models trained with different machine learning algorithms Papernot et al. (2016). Therefore,
adversarial examples must exploit some systematic issue or property of neural nets.
There are several hypothesis attempting to explain the existence of adversarial examples and
the phenomenon of adversarial vulnerability of machine learning models. According to Goodfellow
et al. (2014) the reason why neural nets can be exploited with adversarial examples is excessive
linearity of neural net models. However, it is not only neural nets that are susceptible to attacks,
so further aspects may play a role. Gilmer et al. (2018), Fawzi et al. (2018), Mahloujifar et al.
(2019), and Shafahi et al. (2019) argue that it is the high dimensionality of the input space that
prevents a classifier from learning a robust model that would be resilient to adversarial examples.
On the other hand, Schmidt et al. (2018) argued that adversarial examples arise due to insufficient
information about the true data distribution. Tanay and Griffin (2016) propose that overfitting
causes adversarial examples and suggest to utilize regularization as a form of defense. Another
possible explanation, proposed by Fawzi et al. (2016) and Ford et al. (2019), pertains to noise in
data and maintains that a classifier’s robustness to noise determines the extent of its adversarial
vulnerability. Shamir et al. (2019) suggests that the piecewise-linear geometric structure of decision
boundaries leads to adversarial perturbations. Bubeck et al. (2019) and Nakkiran (2019) argue
that computational constraints or model complexity cause the model to learn non-robust features,
which means that the resulting model may be accurate on benign test data, but highly vulnerable
to adversarial inputs. Finally, Ilyas et al. (2019) claim that adversarial examples can be attributed
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to the presence of non-robust features. They define non-robust features as ”highly predictive,
yet brittle” features, which are well-generalizing on benign data, but vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations. They show that robust training (training on data containing only robust features)
results in classifiers resilient to adversarial attacks. However, training on non-robust features can
help to increase the model accuracy on unmodified non-adversarial data. Therefore, they present
accuracy and robustness as almost a trade-off and claim that ”robustness can be at odds with
accuracy”. Hence, the reasons for the existence and common widespread presence of adversarial
examples is still an active research issue that not fully understood.
2.2 Adversarial Reprogramming
Adversarial reprogramming is a new type of attack introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019), which
reprograms a target model to perform a different task chosen by the attacker. There are two
primary differences between prior adversarial attacks and reprogramming in terms of their goals
and methodology. First, the goal of reprogramming is to reprogram a target model to perform
a different task, while the goal of adversarial examples is to degrade performance of the model.
Second, reprogramming is achieved by finding a single adversarial perturbation, an adversarial
program that can be added to all inputs without the need for crafting many different adversarial
examples and computing their outputs.
Reprogramming does not require modifications to the target network architecture or parameters.
Instead, only two reprogramming functions must be learned to map the inputs and outputs between
the two domains of the new and original task. The motivation of reprogramming is to reprogram an
existing model in a computationally efficient way to perform a new task. Computational efficiency
is key – if the desired results were achievable using a computationally inexpensive classifier created
from scratch specifically for that task, this would defeat the purpose of reprogramming Neekhara
et al. (2019). It has been shown that adversarial reprogramming is significantly less effective on
randomly initialized untrained networks (Elsayed et al. (2019) and Neekhara et al. (2019), which
is evidence that reprogramming works.
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2.2.1 Motivations for Reprogramming
There is a concern that reprogramming could be used for malicious purposes such as theft of
computational resources through attacks on cloud-hosted machine learning models, which could
be maliciously re-purposed by an attacker to, for example, create spam accounts. Such an attack
should be a great concern to cloud providers offering machine learning APIs such as Google or
Amazon. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the current literature on adversarial reprogramming
focused on the security concerns created by adversarial reprogramming, we would like to argue
that reprogramming does not need to be adversarial. Reprogramming has a great potential for
developing high quality models at a significantly reduced computational cost.
2.2.2 Reprogramming Methods
Adversarial reprogramming and its methods were first introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019) and
later used by Neekhara et al. (2019). Elsayed et al. (2019) assume a white-box scenario and their
reprogramming method is based on crafting an adversarial program, which they formulate as an
additive contribution to network input. The adversarial program can be viewed as a ”universal”
adversarial perturbation that can be applied to all inputs, whose parameters are learned through
backpropagation. The goal is to repurpose an existing trained target model with inputs x and
outputs f(x) as seen in Figure 2.1 for a new task with inputs x’ and outputs g(x’) as illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1 Original Setting
Figure 2.2 New Setting
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2.2.2.1 Adversarial Program Crafting
In this section we describe the adversarial program crafting methodology from Elsayed et al.
(2019) with additional details and explanations. Let x ∈ Rn×n×h be an input image for the original
task, where n is the image width and height, and h is the number of channels. Note that grayscale
images have one channel and color images have three channels. Let f(x) be an output of the
original task. The new task sample input is defined as x′ ∈ Rk×k×h, where k < n. The output of
the new task is represented as g(x′). In order to feed the new inputs into the original target model
and receive outputs that are of the new task’s domain as illustrated in Figure 2.3, two mapping
functions are required hf and hg. The function hf maps x
′ into the domain of x, i.e.: hf (x
′, θ) = x.
And hg maps f(x) to g(x
′), i.e.: hg(f(x), θ) = g(x
′).
Figure 2.3 Reprogramming Process
The goal is to learn θ such that hg(f(hf (x
′))) = g(x′). Prior to learning θ the label mapping
function hg is defined as a hard-coded one-to-one mapping function that can convert f(x) to g(x
′).
Let P be the adversarial program, which is applied to all image inputs x’ be defined as:
P = tanh(θ M) (2.4)
where tanh scales the adversarial program to in range of (-1, 1), θ ∈ Rn×n×h are the parameters of
P , and M is a n× n× h masking matrix ∈ 0, 1. Let xadv be the image input after conversion of x′
into the domain of x:
xadv = hf (x
′, θ) (2.5)
The adversarial program P is an additive variable applied to every input x’ as follows:
xadv = x’ + P (2.6)
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Let yadv be the label of xadv. The goal is:
max P (hg(yadv)|xadv) (2.7)
which can be derived as follows:
P (y′|x′) = P (g(x′)|x′) = P (hg(g(x′))|hf (x′, θ)) = P (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ)) = P (hg(yadv)|xadv)) (2.8)
The probability P (hg(yadv)|xadv) can be maximized by solving the following optimization problem:
θ∗ = argmaxθ∈Rn×n×h(P (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ))
θ∗ = argminθ(−P (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ))
θ∗ = argminθ(−logP (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ))
θ∗ = argminθ(−logP (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ) + λ||θ||22))
(2.9)
where λ is a coefficient that serves as a regularization hyperparameter, which is multiplied by L2
norm squared of θ. Therefore, the adversarial program can crafted by solving the optimization
problem argminθ(−logP (hg(yadv)|hf (x′, θ) + λ||θ||22).
2.2.2.2 Reprogramming of Image Classification Neural Networks
Elsayed et al. (2019) conducted reprogramming on image classification pre-trained neural net-
works. Their idea for reprogramming is based on learning adversarial reprogramming functions for
mapping inputs and outputs between different domains. In particular, given a trained target model
that performs some original task that takes x as input and produces f(x) as output and a new task
that takes x’ as input and outputs g(x’), two mapping functions are required:
hf (·; θ), where hf maps x′ into the domain of x
hg(·; θ), where hg maps f(x) into the domain of g(x′)
Elsayed et al. (2019) assume a white-box scenario, which allows them to use backpropagation to
learn hf , which converts the new inputs into the domain of the original inputs that the target model
was trained for. They do not learn the label mapping function hg, which converts the outputs of the
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target model into the outputs of the new task. They simply hard-code some arbitrary mapping that
establishes a correspondence between the original and new labels. Elsayed et al. (2019) conduct
experiments with six different pretrained ImageNet models, which they reprogram to perform new
tasks - counting number of squares in an image, MNIST handwritten digits classification, and
CIFAR-10 image classification. The accuracy achieved on reprogramming pretrained Imagenet
models to classify handwritten digits is impressive - the accuracy is 90% and above on both training
and testing data. However, the accuracy of the pretrained networks reprogrammed to perform
CIFAR-10 image classification is a lot lower - 65% on average for training and testing data.
2.2.2.3 Reprogramming of Text Classification Neural Networks
Neekhara et al. (2019) extends adversarial reprogramming from image to text classification
tasks. They propose a context-based vocabulary remapping function, which is learned through
backpropagation as in the case of image classifiers. However, due to the fact that text is discrete,
they apply Gumbel-Softmax (Jang et al., 2016) to make the optimization problem differentiable.
Neekhara et al. (2019) also perform a black-box attack using reinforcement learning with the re-
programming function being the policy network. They conducted experiments using 5 different
text datasets and three victim models: LSTM, Bi-LSTM, and CNN. The results achieved seem
encouraging in both white-box and black-box setting, which on average yielded a testing accuracy
of 80% and 90% respectively.
2.2.2.4 Defenses against Adversarial Reprogramming
Wang et al. (2019) claim to have developed the first effective defense against adversarial repro-
gramming called Hierarchical Random Switching, a new stochastic defense method which they test
on image classification models. Stochastic defenses such as dropout or adding Gaussian perturb-
ations aim to improve adversarial robustness through useful randomness injected during inference
with the goal to make adversarial examples crafting difficult. In essence, Hierarchical Random
Switching adds several blocks of randomly switching channels derived from a base neural network
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model to prevent adversaries from exploiting fixed model structures and parameters. Similarly to
Ilyas et al. (2019), Wang et al. (2019) argue that the drawback of current defenses is that the
robustness enhancement is at the cost of noticeable performance degradation on legitimate data.
With the goal to alleviate this shortcoming Wang et al. (2019) propose a new metric called Defense
Efficiency Score that measures the gain in unsuccessful attack attempts at the cost of drop in test
accuracy. They claim that Hierarchical Random Switching yields higher Defense Efficiency Score
than current stochastic defences and therefore achieves better robustness accuracy trade-off. The
defense technique proposed by Wang et al. (2019) seems compelling. However, we would like to
argue that we will not know what are the most appropriate defenses against reprogramming or
other types of attacks on machine learning models until the causes for adversarial vulnerabilities
are fully explained.
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTS WITH PRIOR REPROGRAMMING
METHOD
In this section we examine the reprogramming method introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019) in
more detail. First, we apply the method in new scenarios to test if this method also works for
datasets other than the ones tested in Elsayed et al. (2019). Second, we attempt tweaking this
method in various ways to investigate whether the shortcomings of this method discovered in the
first set of experiments can be addressed with small changes to the method.
3.1 Experiment 1: Prior Reprogramming Method
We applied the reprogramming method introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019) to various datasets
and scenarios that have not been explored and found that this method does not work reliably, is
not scaleable, and cannot be applied to more complex tasks as evidenced in Table 3.1. Elsayed
et al. (2019) successfully reprogrammed six different models trained on ImageNet to perform three
relatively simple tasks: counting number of squares in an image, MNIST handwritten digits clas-
sification, and CIFAR 10 image classification. However, when the target model is trained on more
simpler datasets, the accuracy of the reprogrammed model on the new tasks is equivalent to ran-
dom guessing. In addition to that, reprogramming Imagenet models using this technique to perform
more complex tasks such as CIFAR 100 or Caltech 101 does not work well. Moreover, these opera-
tions are quite computationally expensive and therefore, not practical - using Nvidia GPU GeForce
GTX 1080 it took approximately 12 hours to reprogram a Resnet50V2 Imagenet model to perform
MNIST. Based on the results there seems to be a relationship between the reprogramming per-
formance and the nature of the new task - as the input dimension and number of categories get
larger, reprogramming becomes less accurate and more computationally expensive.
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Table 3.1 Reprogramming Experiments with Elsayed et al. (2019) Methodology
Original Task New Task Train Accuracy Test Accuracy
Imagenet2 MNIST 93.69 % 94.36 %
Imagenet CIFAR 100 1.16 % 1.21 %
Imagenet Caltech 100 0.40 % 0.30 %
Caltech 1003 MNIST 9.87 % 9.61 %
CIFAR 104 MNIST 9.03 % 8.92 %
CIFAR 10 FASHION MNIST 14.32 % 14.25 %
CIFAR 10 MNIST 0s and 1s 53.17 % 53.24 %
MNIST FASHION5 MNIST 12.08 % 12.30 %
MNIST FASHION MNIST 0s and 1s 42.82 % 43.83 %
MNIST6 MNIST FASHION 14.66 % 14.94 %
3.2 Experiment 2: Tweaking Prior Reprogramming Method
After concluding that the reprogramming method introduced in Elsayed et al. (2019) does not
work reliably on all datasets we attempted tweaking their methodology in different ways, but none
of them yielded better results. First, we experimented with learning the label mapping function as
opposed to hardcoding it. Second, we tried resizing the new task input image to smaller dimensions
to achieve a higher ratio between the original and new input dimensions. In particular, we took
a model pre-trained on MNIST FASHION with input dimension 28x28x1 and reprogrammed it to
classify resized handwritten 1s and 0s digits with input dimension 4x4x1. Third, we investigated
whether changing the area of the image that is being trained makes a difference. The method in
Elsayed et al. (2019) trains the adversarial program only on the part of the image, where the new
and original image don’t overlap. We tried training the entire area; however, this change also did not
yield better results. Finally, we attempted changing the operations used to apply the adversarial
program to the the new task input image. Specifically, we experimented with multiplying and
subtracting the program from the input image as opposed to adding it as in Elsayed et al. (2019).
2Pretrained Resnet50V2 model
3Train Accuracy: 99.58 %, Test Accuracy: 74.37 %
4Train Accuracy: 92.12 %, Test Accuracy: 80.18 %
5Train Accuracy: 99.99 %, Test Accuracy: 89.40 %
6Train Accuracy: 100.00 %, Test Accuracy: 99.25 %
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CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The shortcomings discovered in the first two sets of experiments with the reprogramming meth-
odology used in prior works motivated us to explore new techniques for reprogramming and lead
to proposing a new and improved methodology for reprogramming.
Our proposed methodology assumes access to target model parameters and architecture, which
is reprogrammed to perform a new chosen task. The objective is to learn input and output repro-
gramming functions that allow for re-using a trained model without changing the original model
parameters to create new model performing a new task. Prior works focused on crafting an ad-
versarial program that served as additive contribution to inputs and learning the adversarial pro-
gram parameters while hardcoding an arbitrary mapping between to original and new labels. This
can be expressed as:
x+ P, (4.1)
where x is the new task inputs and P is the adversarial program. Our improved technique does
not rely on simple constant additive contribution to inputs and arbitrarily hardcoding label map-
pings, instead it is based on learning two programs/functions - one applied to inputs and one to
outputs. The first program applied to the new task inputs x can be viewed as a conversion or input
adjustment function that outputs x′, an adjusted input that can be passed into the target model,
i.e.:
x′ = f(x) (4.2)
The purpose of function f is to resize the input image such that its dimensions match the ones that
the target model accepts. The second program applied to the target model outputs is represented
as a new dense layer containing a number of neurons equal to number of new task labels and a
softmax activation function.
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The softmax function takes an input vector of k real numbers and outputs k probabilities that





where zi is the unnormalized log probability that x belongs to class i:
zi = logP̃ (y = i|x) (4.4)
The original target model parameters are not changed, only the last dense layer that outputs
probabilities is removed. Therefore, the second program can be expressed as a function g:
y = g(NN ′(x′)), (4.5)
where y′ is the new task label and NN ′ is the original model with the last layer removed.
The goal of a neural is to approximate some function f∗, in case of classification mapping
function f∗(x) = y, which maps input x to class y. The objective is to find function f that
approximates the true function f∗. Therefore the mapping can be expressed as y = f(x; θ) and
the goal is to learn θ which represents the neural net weights and biases that results in best
approximation of f∗. A deep neural net is a chain of functions, where each function represents one
layer:
f(x) = f (L)(f (L−1)...(f (1)(x))) (4.6)
Training a neural net from scratch requires learning weights and biases for all functions f (1),...f (L).
However, our reprogramming method allows us to re-use θ from a previously trained target model
for layers 1, ..., L− 1 and learn the parameters of the last layer only, which can be formulated as:
y = f (L)(h; θ), (4.7)
where h are the values of hidden units from the penultimate layer.
Therefore, our goal is to maximize probability P (y|f (l)(f (l−1))), which can be set up as an
optimization problem:
θ̂ = argminθ(−logP (y|h)) (4.8)
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS OF PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section describes the experiments conducted and their results.
5.1 Experiment 3: New and Improved Reprogramming Method
To demonstrate effectiveness and superiority of our reprogramming method, we conducted ex-
periments on eight different architectures trained on ImageNet, which served as the target model
and were reprogrammed to perform new tasks: Caltech 101 and Caltech 256 - reduced image clas-
sification. As evidenced in Table 5.1 our reprogramming method yields higher accuracy than prior
works even on more complex tasks. We also trained models on Caltech 101 and Caltech 256 -
reduced datasets from scratch with the same hyperparameters and number of training epochs to
compare the effectiveness of training a model utilizing our reprogramming method and training a
model from scratch.
Using our methodology we successfully reprogrammed various pre-trained ImageNet models to
perform classification on Caltech 101 and Caltech 256 - reduced datasets. It can be seen that
the testing accuracy of models trained from scratch is significantly lower than of models trained
using our reprogramming technique. It is possible to create models from scratch with much higher
accuracy than the one we report; however, this requires increased training time and careful hy-
perparamenter tuning. The purpose of comparing reprogrammed models and models trained from
scratch is to compare the two techniques in terms of the effort spent to create them. In both cases
we trained models only for 10 epochs with the same hyperparameters contained in the appendix.
Most models created with reprogramming performed very well - the average testing accuracy
on Caltech 101 was 82.07 % with the best testing accuracy of 89.81 % achieved by reprogramming
ResNet152V2. This is a significantly better result compared to the model created from scratch
using the same hyperparameters, which achieved only 38.95 % testing accuracy on Caltech 101.
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The Caltech 256 models created through our reprogramming method also performed significantly
better than the model made from scratch train with the same hyperparameters. The average
testing accuracy of the models made using reprogramming was 55.95 % with the best one of 69.65
% created through reprogramming ResNet152V2, whereas the testing accuracy of the model made
from scratch was only 3.63 %. While an average testing accuracy of 55.95 % is not very high, it
should be noted that the training dataset was reduced by 83 % and that the testing accuracy of
the model created from scratch using the same hyperparameters was a mere 3.63 %.
Overall, these results demonstrate that: (1) our reprogramming method is superior to the prior
method, and (2) that our reprogramming method can be used to quickly create new accurate models
without requiring much training time and hyperparameter tuning.
Table 5.1 Reprogramming Experiments with New and Improved Methodology
Original Task New Task
Imagenet Caltech 101 Reduced Caltech 256
architecture train test train test
ResNet50V2 98.16% 88.73% 98.39% 66.93%
ResNet101V2 98.48% 89.48% 98.36% 70.04%
ResNet152V2 98.14% 89.81% 97.75% 69.65%
MobileNet 96.94% 83.05% 95.89% 53.96%
NASNetMobile 93.19% 82.73% 92.19% 67.06%
MobileNetV2 93.47% 83.05% 91.58% 60.05%
VGG16 80.79% 71.14% 54.10% 29.96%
VGG19 80.44% 68.56% 55.02% 29.96%
From scratch 85.16% 38.95% 27.47% 3.63%
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY
The focus of this paper on reprogramming of neural networks, which involves re-purposing a
target model to perform a new task without changing its parameters. We introduce new reprogram-
ming methodology that improves upon Elsayed et al. (2019) and demonstrate that this method,
compared to prior works, yields more accurate results, is more scalable, and can be applied to
complex tasks. The first two sets of experiments focus on exploring reprogramming methodology
from prior literature and show that, among other shortcomings, it does not scale well to more
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Link to code implementation: https://github.com/ekloberdanz/Thesis/tree/master/FinalCode
Table .1 Hyperparameters used for reprogramming and creating models from scratch
Hyperparameter Value
batch size 128
number of epochs 10
optimizer adam
learning rate 0.001
The datasets used in our experiments along with their descriptions are listed in Table .2.
Table .2 Datasets
Dataset Name Number of Categories Input Dimensions Description
Caltech 256 - reduced1 256 224 x 224 x 3 Various images
Caltech 101 101 224 x 224 x 3 Various images
CIFAR 100 100 32 x 32 x 3 Various images
CIFAR 10 10 32 x 32 x 3 Various images
MNIST FASHION 10 28 x 18 x 1 Clothing items
MNIST 10 28 x 18 x 1 Handwritten digits
MNIST 0s and 1s 2 28 x 18 x 1 Handwritten digits
1The Caltech 256 dataset was reduced from 30,607 images to only 5,140 images
